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ABSTRACT
It  has  been well  documented that  corruption negatively  affects 
economic development. The purpose of this paper is to quantify 
the effect  that  Internet access  in a  country has  on  the level of 
corruption  by  studying  a  cross  section  of  a  larger  sample  of 
approximately  150  countries.  The  paper  extends  the  model  in 
Vinod  (1999;  2003)  and  includes  political,  economic,  and 
technological factors that can affect the level of corruption.  We 
also present short country case studies to illustrate how some are 
using the Internet in their efforts to curtail corruption.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.2.0, C.2.5, G.3, J.1, J.4
General Terms
Economics, Legal Aspects.
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1. INTRODUCTION
It  has  been  well  documented  that  corruption  negatively  affects 
economic  development  [3-8].  There  is  empirical  evidence  that 
corruption  increases  market  volatility,  bank  failures,  and 
discourages  foreign  direct  investment  (FDI)  in  less  developed 
countries.  Vinod  (1999)  estimated  that  a  dollar  reduction  in 
corruption would benefit developing countries by at least $1.67. 
He also suggested that the Internet could be an additional tool for 
governments to curb corruption.  Vinod’s  model nonetheless  did 
not  include  Internet  hosts  or  subscribers  among  the  variables. 
Since  1999  the  Internet  has  grown  immensely  and  is  even 
approaching  some  remote  areas  of  poor  countries.  Hence  it  is 
necessary to update the older empirical research and broaden the 
focus  to  include  these technological  advances.  The purpose  of 
this paper is to quantify the effect that Internet access in a country 
has  on the level of  corruption by studying  a cross  section of  a 
larger sample of approximately 150 countries. The paper extends 
the model in Vinod [1, 2] and includes political, economic,  and 
technological factors that can affect the level of corruption. 
Information as a tool to fight corruption has not been empirically 
analyzed. This is surprising, considering that corruption thrives in 
an  environment  of  secrecy.  We believe  that  Internet  access  is 
valuable in any country because it provides citizens with relevant 
information  about  specific  government  regulations,  services, 
deadlines,  fees  and  requirements.  A well-known  dictum  states: 
“knowledge  is  power.”  The  Internet  can  spread  this  power  of 
information  equitably  to  the  benefit  of  all,  thereby  preventing 
monopolistic middlemen from abusing it. It can expose instances 
of (i) threats, (ii) arbitrary changes in rules or deadlines, and (iii) 
demands for bribes by bureaucrats.
 We know that  some  countries  have  taken  advantage  of  these 
technologies  in  their  efforts  to  fight  corruption.  In  Kenya,  for 
example, the government set up a pilot project in Electronic Graft 
Management.  The  aim  is  to  “increase  public  awareness  and 
encourage public participation in fighting corrupt practices” [9]. 
In developed countries the trend is toward greater transparency, 
which is accomplished by publishing information on the Internet 
about  the  relationships  between  government  agencies  and 
individuals or companies.
An additional  objective here is  to provide  recommendations  to 
governments about the potential uses of the Internet as a tool to 
deter corruption.  The  remainder  of  the paper  is  organized  into 
four  sections.  Section  two  provides  background  information 
related to the factors that scholars have identified as being related 
to corruption reduction. The third section has statistical analysis. 
Following that we present short country case studies to illustrate 
how  some  are  using  the  Internet  in  their  efforts  to  curtail 
corruption. The last part of the paper presents the conclusions.
2. BACKGROUND RESEARCH
In  his  book  Institutions,  Institutional  Change,  and  Economic  
Performance  Douglas  North  [10]  argues  that  institutions1 
determine economic activity. Individuals will generally engage in 
activities  that  generate the greatest  economic  returns.  Sadly,  in 
many countries the most lucrative activities are bribes, kickbacks, 
and illegal favors that, while benefiting the individuals involved, 
1  Institutions are rules that help people for expectations in their 
dealing  with  others.  There  are  formal  and  informal  rules  or 
institutions. The first one are laws and regulations enforced by 
the state while informal rules are enforced through social peer 
pressure.
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create serious negative distortions in the economy and undermine 
citizens’ trust in the (democratic) institutions of the country.
When a country experiences high levels of corruption these illegal 
activities are already institutionalized and have become a part of 
the  fabric  of  society.  Fadahunsi  &  Rosa  [11]  describe  the 
example  of  Nigeria,  where  both  legal  and  illegal  goods  are 
commonly  traded  through  a  complex  and  corrupt  network  of 
social  relationships  that  through  favoritism  and  bribes  allows 
individuals to avoid the payment of duties. On the surface it may 
appear that these illegal activities have created additional jobs and 
some  merchants  have  benefited  from  the corrupt  system.  Yet, 
corruption  creates  considerable  additional  costs,  arising  from 
uncertainty  and  stress  in  trading  relations.  Hence  it  is  not 
surprising  that  Fadahunsi  &  Rosa  find  that  most  traders  in 
Nigeria would rather have an impartial  legal system,  instead of 
the status quo.
Corruption is a complex problem.  One factor cannot be isolated 
over others as the culprit to the problem.  In most cases it is the 
result  of  a  combination  of  elements  that  create  circumstances 
favorable  to  corrupt  activities.  Socio-economic  and  political 
factors often determine the level of corruption in a country. In this 
paper we argue that information disseminated by the Internet can 
be an important tool for curtailing corruption.
Jain [12] identifies three types of corruption: (1) grand corruption 
taking  place  at  the  top  levels  of  government  (2)  bureaucratic 
corruption by appointed officials in their relationships either with 
other  members  of  government  or  the  general  public  seeking 
services,  and  (c)  legislative  corruption  where  legislators  are 
engaged in corruption as  a result  of  their relations with interest 
groups,  seeking  favors,  or  because  of  politicians’  election 
ambitions.
In this study we want to explore the effect of the Internet as an 
information  tool  on  the  levels  of  corruption.  Because  of  the 
statistical  nature of this study we need to consider other factors 
that  could  also  affect  corruption.  The  scholarly  research  about 
corruption has identified political and socio-economic factors that 
contribute to the problem.  Political  studies have focused on the 
effect  of  corruption  on  the strength  of  the democratic  process. 
Economic factors link these illegal activities to levels of poverty. 
Because  corruption  thrives  in  an  environment  of  secrecy,  our 
hypothesis  here  is  that  the  Internet  as  a  medium  to  provide 
information will reduce it. 
Below we summarize the main findings from research in each of 
these areas  and  describe the model  we developed,  as  shown in 
Figure 1, to analyze the data collected.
Figure 1
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2.1 Political factors and information
Much  research  has  been  focused  on  the  political  factors  that 
contribute to corruption. Corruption is possible as a result of the 
monopoly  power that some members  of  government  have over 
the resources or services provided by these entities. This is further 
exacerbated  when  there  is  a  lack  of  clarity  about  rules, 
procedures,  requirements,  and  fees.  The facts  regarding  correct 
procedures are either hidden or do not exist, giving these officials 
discretionary  power [12,  13].  By  contrast,  government  Internet 
sites  can  provide  correct  information  about  the  government 
regulations  and  services,  helping  to  reduce  the  discretionary 
power of bureaucrats.
Corrupt activities can happen within governments, in private and 
non-profit  organizations,  as  well  as  in  everyday  economic 
activities.  One  of  the conditions  for  corruption  to  occur  is  the 
ability of one of the parties in the relationship to give to another a 
privilege that  would otherwise  be difficult  to get.  Governments 
are thus one of the main sources of corruption because there are 
many  activities  within  the purview of  the state  in  the form of 
licenses,  permissions,  contracts,  and  so forth directly  controlled 
by  some  powerful  individuals  in  government.  Since  it  is  often 
impossible  to  imagine  all  situations,  one  cannot  write detailed 
rules  for  all  instances.  Hence  discretionary  powers  become 
unavoidable for smooth functioning of any government. 
Scholarly  research  has  shown  that  democratization  can  be 
effective in reducing  instances  of  corruption.  Governments  that 
suffer from weak electoral processes due to fraud are also likely 
to suffer from corruption.  In  this regard,  Alt & Lassen [14]  as 
well  as  Adsera  et  al.  [15],  have  argued  that  regular  and  fair 
elections  allow  citizens  to  discipline  politicians.  The  threat  of 
losing their position in government compels them to respond to 
citizen  interests.  Unfortunately,  elections  can  be  costly  for 
political  parties and rather than eliminating corruption, they can 
create  a  need  for  funds.  Scholars  who  argue  that  an  electoral 
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system can  reduce instances  of  corruption  assume  a  politically 
educated  and  informed  electorate.  Moreover,  some  upper  level 
and legislative corruption is hidden from the population at large 
by co-opting the media, who depend on government favors in the 
form  of  newsprint,  government  ads,  and  access  to  politicians. 
Sometimes many politicians conspire to not expose instances of 
corruption.
Sadly, corruption itself erodes the faith of the general population 
in  democratic  values.  When,  as  a  result  of  corruption,  the 
electorate loses  its trust in the people who represent them, they 
also becomes cynical, passive, and disengaged from participating 
in the competitive democratic process [16]. Thus one of the tools 
that could have helped reduce and potentially eliminate corruption 
is weakened by public distrust and cynicism with the system. Hill 
[17]  focuses  on  specific  components  of  democratization.  He 
argues  that  transparency  reduces  instances  of  corruption,  while 
helping support a healthier democratic process.
It is clear that a system of incentives that favors an environment 
of corruption and lack of transparency is indeed present in many 
countries.  The  failure  of  governments  to  successfully  deter 
corrupt  activities  is  generally  due to a  failure to police  corrupt 
behavior,  enforce  laws,  and  effectively  punish  the  miscreants. 
Thus  among  political  factors  to  be considered  in  our  study  of 
corruption, is the presence of enforcement mechanisms. The state 
should be able to impose sanctions on those public officials that 
have violated their public duties. A system of sanctions requires 
the  government  to  have  the  resources  to  police  these  illegal 
activities and the judicial system should be able to investigate and 
bring violators to justice [18].
Detection of corruption is the first step in a country’s enforcement 
efforts  but  a  fair  and  reliable  judicial  system  is  important  for 
rebuilding trust  and  to potentially  empower more individuals  to 
take action against these acts. A study by Della Porta [19] about 
corruption in Italy found that the strong independence of judges 
from the political  apparatus of the country serves to protect the 
public from the abusive power of some of government officials. 
In these enforcement efforts, information about abuses and court 
decisions  as  well  as  protection  to  whistle-blowers  can  be 
additional  empowering  tools  that  individuals  can  use to expose 
these activities.
 In this respect Alam [20] finds that perhaps several court cases 
may  be  more  effective  than  one  big  case  representing  many 
individuals.  A similar type of effect can be achieved through an 
Internet site that reports and maintains an archive of incidents of 
corruption.
2.1 Economic factors
Economic factors that affect corruption are also linked 
to  levels  of  poverty,  which  in  turn  affect  factors  such  as 
education. Scholars who have studied the problem of corruption 
in  many countries  have found a  correlation  between economic 
inequality, impoverishment, and unemployment [21].  Economic 
hardship  often contributes  to  corruption  [22].  This  relationship 
nonetheless  runs  both  ways:  corruption  decreases  as  income 
increases,  and  similarly  income  increases  with  reduction  in 
corruption [8].
The  poverty  argument  reasons  that  poorly  paid  government 
employees will attempt to obtain additional sources of income by 
trying  to  extract  bribes  in  exchange  of  favors.  One  suggested 
solution to this problem is to increase the salaries of government 
officials  [23].  The problem is that  many  countries with a  high 
level  of  poverty  cannot  afford  to  do  this.  Under  these 
circumstances one could argue that a transparent government that 
takes advantage of the Internet to diffuse information widely and 
inexpensively could be an alternative.
Another suggestion to the problem of poorly paid bureaucrats has 
been the decentralization of  government  offices.  This,  as  Alam 
[20] describes, creates smaller units that could allow the public to 
demand efficient and corruption free services as a result of having 
information from other units. In addition these smaller units have 
more  limited  powers  and  thus  a  lower  opportunity  to  extract 
bribes from users. When payments, procedures, and requirements 
for government services are widely dispersed, under a system of 
quasi competition among agencies providing similar services, this 
may bring down the “bribery” price of a government service. 
Another problem associated with poverty is that  the population 
feels powerless to address the problem of corruption. As Zipparo 
[24]  found,  low  income  individuals  are  less  likely  to  report 
instances  of  corruption  if  there  are  no  incentives  or  protective 
mechanisms that could encourage them to do so. The Internet can 
provide the public with anonymous reporting of corrupt activities. 
This  would  reduce  the  risks  associated  with  reporting  or 
denouncing instances of corruption.
In  general,  a  population  with  few  economic  opportunities  is 
motivated by basic survival and must find some way of obtaining 
resources, even if some of these are illegal and further contribute 
to the problem of underdevelopment. This argument is consistent 
with  Schelling’s  [25]  Micromotives  and  Macrobehavior  where 
self-interested  individuals  are  motivated  to  engage  in  activities 
that benefit them but harm the community as a whole. Corruption 
works in a similar manner; individuals derive immediate personal 
benefits that positively affect  their welfare but severely affect  a 
country’s economic, political, and social system.
Gerring & Thacker [26]  find that neo-liberal economic policies, 
which  are generally  associated with the opening  of  markets for 
trade and competition, have reduced corruption. They explain that 
commercial contact with companies and organizations from other 
countries  forces  higher  standards  of  conduct  by  domestic 
companies.  This  paper  hypothesizes  that  providing  information 
on  the  Internet  can  help  the  developing  countries  reduce 
corruption and attract more FDI.
Income has also been associated with levels of education, which 
can  reduce  corruption.  This  may  occur  because  people  with 
higher levels of education would be expected to have a broader 
understanding of the negative social effects of corruption, looking 
beyond their narrow individual benefits [27]. 
Education can help fight corruption through the enforcement of 
anti-corruption laws.  Individuals with higher levels of education 
are likely to be alert  regarding  their own  rights  to  government 
services,  without  having  to  pay  bribes.  Thus  the  educated  are 
likely  to  protest  when  their  rights  are  denied  by  corrupt 
bureaucrats. The relationship between income and education is a 
close one. As Alam [20] explains, an illiterate farmer may be less 
able to understand his rights due to a lack of education; and, at 
the same time, poverty may deny him the resources to engage in 
any type of denunciations.  College students, in addition to being 
able  to  understand  the  ill  effects  of  corruption,  also  have  the 
resources to get organized to fight corruption.
 An additional mechanism linking education and corruption is as 
follows. It is argued by Carvajal [28] that poorly educated people 
are  more  likely  to  be  duped  or  pressured  into  engaging  in  a 
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corrupt activity than those who are more educated. Thus a society 
with higher participation  in education  is likely to have a  lower 
level  of  corruption.  Again,  the  Internet  can  play  a  role  in 
educating people about corruption  per se and help in achieving 
greater awareness its ill effects.
2.3  The  Internet  as  a  factor  enhancing 
information
As  stated  by  Vinod  [1]  “a  fight  against  corruption  involves 
fighting human nature. A bribe occurs when both parties benefit 
and  it  is  generally  difficult  to balance  a  large potential  benefit 
enjoyed  by  both  parties  with  appropriate  punishments  and 
disincentives.  Three fundamental  problems  with corruption  are: 
(a)  it  is  hidden,  (b)  incentives  for  fighting  it  are  improperly 
aligned, and (c) international jurisdiction is missing … [A]ll three 
problems can be simultaneously attacked by using Internet-based 
innovative techniques”.
In  this  paper  we argue  that  access  to  information  can  support 
other  factors  that  have  been  found  effective  in  reducing 
corruption.  It  can  support  democratization  efforts,  law 
enforcement, FDI, and education.
In  the past  the main  source  for  information  about  incidents  of 
corruption  was  the  media.  Media  outlets  not  only  inform  the 
public regarding corrupt individuals,  but also are valuable tools 
for  law  enforcement.  In  this  regard  Maor  (2004)  found  that 
prosecutors  are more likely to be successful  in  their  efforts  to 
punish  the corrupt  when  the media  in  a  country  is  sufficiently 
independent of government influence. In this paper we argue that 
the Internet is,  perhaps,  a  potentially  more useful  tool for  both 
dissemination  of  information  and  law  enforcement  than 
traditional media outlets. The traditional media of television and 
newspapers  generally  lack  sufficient  depth in their treatment  of 
complex  corruption stories.  They also  have short  shelf  life, are 
difficult  to  update,  and  are  motivated  by  newsworthiness.  By 
contrast, the Internet can provide a more readily accessible, up to 
date, detailed, and almost permanent record for anyone to check. 
The power of the Internet as a tool to fight corruption lies in its 
abilities  to  diffuse  information  widely  and  in  an  efficient  and 
quasi-permanent basis. 
The Internet also has the ability to allow the public to easily and 
relatively inexpensively publish information through anonymous 
forms  or simply by keeping a record of instances  of corruption 
reported  by  the  press.  Anonymous  denunciations,  although 
potentially empowering, can be abused.  This is the downside of 
the Internet. Whether it helps or hurts on balance depends on how 
the Internet itself is policed to purge false or vicious information.
The  Internet  can  support  democratic  election  processes  by 
providing  the  public  with  information  about  past  corruption 
incidents of political candidates. The fear of being exposed on the 
Internet  might  well  discourage  corrupt  officials  from  seeking 
powerful political offices.  In the presence of public information 
about  corrupt  incidents  in  politicians’  past  life  on  the Internet, 
such office seekers will not be able to survive in a functioning 
competitive democratic society [29]. 
In the age of traditional media  it was quite possible for corrupt 
officials to rely on the poor collective memory of the population. 
Politicians or government officials that were engaged in instances 
of  corruption could  remain  in the system for  many  years even 
when  they  were  suspected  of  corruption.  The  Internet  should 
change this.
The Internet can also  directly reduce corruption by helping law 
enforcement  efforts  through  easier  access  to  information  for 
prosecutors.  As  witnessed  by  one  of  the  authors,  in  and 
experiment in India the prosecutors sought anonymous answers to 
the question: “who is the most corrupt in a particular office and 
why?”  This  helped them build  a case.  Diffusion  of  knowledge 
about corruption cases can thus serve as a deterrent. 
As  was  stated  above  greater  economic  openness  reduces 
corruption.  Higher  commercial  standards  and  transparency  are 
generally required in dealing with foreigners.  It is also true that 
foreign  institutions  including  non-governmental  organizations 
(NGOs), international organizations, and foreign private investors 
put pressure on governments to curtail corruption. If civil society 
can  expose  instances  of  corruption  on  the Internet  that  remain 
visible  and  unsolved  for  years,  it  obviously  puts  additional 
pressure on the country to change.
The  Internet  can  also  support  educational  efforts  related  to 
reducing  corruption.  This  can  happen  through  government 
Internet  sites  that  clearly  state  various  steps,  documents,  time 
limits, and fees that individuals  or corporations need to have to 
obtain  a  particular  government  service  or  permit.  The  public 
availability  of  such  information  on  the Internet  can  potentially 
reduce  the  amount  of  “speed  money”  necessary  to  obtain  a 
service.  It  is  beneficial  to empower the citizen with knowledge 
about  specific  rules  and  reduce,  if  not  eliminate,  much  of  the 
discretionary  power  and  uncertainty  related  to  the  process  of 
obtaining a government service or permit.  The Internet can thus 
curb some of the secrecy that helps corruption thrive. 
Studies  of  corruption  have  revealed  that  a  system  of 
accountability includes answerability or the obligation of  public 
officials  to keep citizens  informed  of  their activities [30].  This 
will require governments to provide information, facts, and data 
about public activities.  Answerability, as described by Schedler, 
also requires a free press:  “(t)he media  is not only the primary 
purveyor  of  information  to  the  public,  but  also  is  the  public 
monitor  (watchdog)  who  reports  public  activities  and  initiates 
discourses on the topics most important to society” [30]. In this 
regard Maor  [31]  found  that  prosecutors  are more  likely to be 
successful in their efforts when there is media accessibility. 
This  paper  hypothesizes  that  the  Internet  could  be  more 
successful  than  traditional  media  outlets  because  it  provides  a 
more readily accessible, complete, and up to date record. Greater 
transparency  as  well  as  the  diffusion  of  knowledge  about 
corruption cases can serve as a deterrent.
3. METHODS AND DATA
The dataset includes approximately 180 countries. The dependent 
variable for this project is Transparency International’s corruption 
perception index (CPI). The data originates from several datasets. 
Table 1 presents each of the independent variables, the source, as 
well as the transformation  that was done on some of those that 
suffer greatest skewness. 
International data generally suffers from a high level of missing 
fields.  To alleviate this problem we used a multiple imputation 
technique where missing  data is generated simultaneously using 
all the available variables for every observation. Specifically, we 
used  the  Amelia  program  developed  by  Honaker,  et  al.  [32] 
because  “methodologists  and  statisticians  agree  that  ‘multiple 
imputation’ is a superior approach to the problem of missing data 
scattered through one's explanatory and dependent variables than 
the methods currently used in applied data analysis.” 
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Because  the imputation  procedure requires  normally  distributed 
variables we thus transform some of them to reduce the impact of 
skewness in the data. These transformed variables were also used 
in the regression analysis.
The  data  analysis  consisted  of  a  cross  section  weighted  least 
square regression. This regression technique uses weights for each 
data point into the fitting estimation. The weight in this case was 
the per capita income in each of the countries. The advantage of 
using the weighted regression method in our context is to reduce 
the  impact  of  heteroskedasticity  arising  from  massive  income 
differences across  countries.  Absolute value of the residual was 
used for the weighted least squares. The prefix “l” is attached to 
the variable name when the log transformation is used. The listing 
of variables is in the order of economic, political, and technology.
Table 1 Description of Dependent Variables
Variable 
name Description of variable Source of Data
Transformation
Done
Region
Region 1= europe 2= middle east 3= africa 4 = Latin America 5 =east asia 6 = 
south asia
[33] Raw
Income Income 1= low 2= lower middle 3 upper middle 4 = high [33] Raw
Cpi Corruption perception Index (0 highly corrupt 10 highly clean) [34] Log
Pop Total population [35] Log
Grwth Average annual growth rate [35] Raw
PPP
Purchasing Power Parity conversion factor or units of a country’s currency 
required to buy the same amounts of goods and services in US $ in US 
domestic market.
[35] Log
Govt General Government Consumption as a % of GDP [35] Sqrt
Trade Trade as a percentage of GDP [35] Log
Educ Education Index [36] Raw
Ineq % of income (or consumption) enjoyed by the richest 20% earners [36] Sqrt
Ecfree
Index of economic freedom 1=“free,” “most-ly free,” “mostly unfree,” and 5 
=“repressed.”
[37] Raw
Fpress
fredom of the press Rating: Free (F): 0-30; Partly Free (PF): 31-60; Not Free 
(NF): 61-100
[38] Sqrt
informal
Informal Market 1 = very low, 1.5 2 =low, 2.5-3 = moderate, 3.5-4 high, 4.5-5 
very high
[37] Raw
Judic
Confidence level in the judiciary system (%)Percentage of firms that agree with 
the statement "I am confident that the judicial system will enforce my 
contractual and property rights in business disputes."
[39] Raw
Legal
Legal system/conflict resolution Percentage of firms that say the legal system 
presents major or severe obstacles to the operation and growth of their business 
[39] Climate Survey Log
Redtp
Senior management time spent in dealing with requirements of government 
regulation (%)
[39] Climate Survey Log
Polstb
Political stability and the degree to which the process becomes violent or tends 
to disintegrate
[40] Raw
Ggi GGI is good governance index designed tobe between 0 and 1 [41] Raw
interhost Internet hosts in a country (if zero, the data are considered missing) [33] Log
interus Internet users in a country (these range between 1250 and 159 million) [33] Log
5
Table 2  reports  the  correlation  coefficients  between Linterhost  and 
Linterus  and the dependent  and independent variables  are listed in 
Table 1.  The correlations are computed in such a way that we have 
attempted to include as many observations (Nobs) as possible. For the 
variables Linterhost and Linterus the largest Nobs are 172 and 174 
respectively (see right bottom of Table 2). We have verified that the 
signs of all correlation coefficients are intuitively correct. For example, 
higher lcpi means lower (not higher) corruption.
Table 2 Correlation Coefficients of Internet variables with all others 
Correlation P-value Nobs
vvari Linterhost Linteruss Linterhost Linteruss Linterhost Linteruss
lcpi 0.687 0.508 0 0 98 98
lppp 0.722 0.615 0 0 152 153
lpop 0.413 0.678 0 0 174 172
surban 0.521 0.502 0 0 174 172
sineq -0.274 -0.259 0.002 0.004 126 123
ecfree -0.631 -0.46 0 0 151 150
grwth -0.155 -0.123 0.046 0.116 166 165
informal -0.619 -0.519 0 0 151 150
ltrade -0.102 -0.189 0.217 0.021 147 149
litrcy 0.618 0.5 0 0 78 79
educ 0.625 0.565 0 0 168 168
polstb 0.479 0.307 0 0 168 167
ggi 0.655 0.489 0 0 169 168
judic 0.239 0.24 0.106 0.104 47 47
llegal -0.097 -0.061 0.568 0.722 37 37
sgovt 0.151 0.004 0.072 0.958 142 142
sfpress -0.356 -0.235 0 0.003 153 154
lredtp 0.055 0.112 0.721 0.463 45 45
Linterhost 1 0.829 NA 0 174 168
Linteruss 0.829 1 0 NA 168 172
The correlation coefficients of greatest interest here are 
those between the two Internet variables (linterhost and linterus) 
and  the  corruption  variables  such  as  lcpi  and  the  governance 
variable ggi. We note that these are statistically significant with P 
values of 0.0000. The P-values are reported along the second set 
of two columns for Linterhost and Linterus. This suggests that it 
is  plausible to hypothesize that the Internet reduces corruptions 
and helps improve governance. Since the Linterhost and Linterus 
variables are highly correlated and have a P value of 0.0000, we 
are justified in using one of the two variables in our model.
3.1 Descriptive statistics
The purpose  of  this  section  is  to present  two-way  plots  of  the 
relationships  of  interests.  The  significance  of  some  of  the 
relationships shown in the tables included in this section can only 
be elucidated through the statistical analysis. The idea nonetheless 
is to provide a general idea of the patterns that then will guide the 
statistical tests of the following sections.  In this paper we argue 
that economic  political  and technological  factors  have a role in 
the level of  corruption.  Figure 2 shows  a  two by  two table of 
purchasing  power parity and the corruption perception index.  It 
confirms  the strong correlation that has  been represented in the 
corruption literature.
Figure 2: Correlation between purchasing power parity and 
corruption Index
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Political  factors  have  an  even  more  prominent  role  in  studies 
about corruption. The Good Governance Index captures many of 
the political  factors  in  corruption  that  scholars  have  identified. 
Figure  3  demonstrates  the  strong  correlation  between  good 
governance and corruption. 
Figure 3 Correlation between good governance index and 
corruption index
The  relationship  that  we  wish  to  explore  in  this  paper  is 
nonetheless  of  the  technological  factors  that  can  help  reduce 
incidence  of  corruption.  Specifically  we  want  to  determine  if 
information provided through websites could become an effective 
deterrence mechanism. Figure 4 presents the graphical correlation 
between these two variables. In this case the relationship is not as 
clear  as  the two political  and  economic  variables  shown  in the 
previous graphs. 
Figure 4 Correlation between internet users and corruption index
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3.1 Regression analysis
Clearly, there are many ways of specifying a regression 
relationship  between  our  dependent  variable  (cpi)  and  the 
regressors.  In  this  paper  we  use  an  eclectic  model  based  on 
various  forms  used  in  the  literature  including  those  in  Vinod 
(1999). An important improvement implemented here is the use 
of weighted instead of ordinary regression. This is motivated by 
the heteroskedasticity detected by White’s test. With international 
data across a wide range of incomes and population sizes it is not 
surprising  that  these  differences  lead  to  heteroskedasticity. 
Another innovation was in using the Hausman test to make sure 
that we do not have endogeneity of the regressors. The results are 
reported in Table 3. Where the (natural) log transformation is used 
we indicate this with (ln).
Although  our  main  interest  is  the  effect  of  Internet 
usage on cpi we include population as a control variable. Larger 
countries  will  naturally  have  higher  Internet  use  and  perhaps 
greater corruption (lower cpi). Many other variables such as the 
highly  significant  good  governance  index  (GGI)  or  size  of 
government  in  the  economic  life  of  a  country  and  PPI  are 
included in the regression as control variables because we want to 
assess the effect of the Internet beyond these variables. We have 
also included dummies for regions of the world and growth rates 
as controls. The aim is to obtain a conservative estimate of the 
impact of the Internet usage on corruption, over and above these 
factors.
Of the economic variables, income and the size of the 
population  are  significant.  As  income  increases  the  level  of 
cleanliness increases while larger countries have higher levels of 
corruption. By contrast, education, trade, and income inequality 
are not significant. 
Of the political variables, freedom of the press and the 
Good  Governance  Index  are  both  significant.  Not  surprisingly 
they  show  that  as  the  press  becomes  more  independent  from 
government influence, degree of corruption declines. Similarly the 
higher  the  good  governance  index  the  greater  the  cleanliness. 
Those  variables  that  address  the  efficiency  and  size  of  the 
government as well as the time that executives spend in dealing 
with requirements of government regulation are also significant. 
The signs  of  the variables  present  some puzzling  results.  First 
they show that larger governments tend to be cleaner. This could 
potentially be explained by the existence of greater resources to 
spend on enforcement activities. It also shows that the more time 
executives  spend in  complying  with government  regulation the 
cleaner the country. This is an unexpected result that will require 
further exploration. Regional differences that we expected to find 
as a result of similar cultural and institutional conditions are that 
African countries experience greater corruption than those of East 
Asia. 
Table 3 shows that the Internet, the variable of interest, 
is significant only at the 10% level. Note that freedom of the press 
and  the  red  tape  variable  measured  by  percent  of  senior 
management  time  spent  in  dealing  with  requirements  of 
government regulation are the only two competing variables more 
important than the Internet in reducing corruption. The relatively 
low significance level suggests that further research is necessary 
to  determine  the  impact  that  this  type  of  technology  has  on 
corruption.  In the following section we present three short case 
studies that can help explain why this variable does not show a 
stronger relationship.
Table 3 Weighted Regression Results 
(Standard Errors in parentheses)
Variable Name
Corruption 
perception 
Index 
(cpi=10 
highly 
clean) is 
dependent 
variable 
(ln)
Purchasing Power Parity (ln) 0.071*(0.039)
Total population (ln) -0.065**(0.028)
% of income (or consumption) enjoyed 
by the richest 20% earners (sqrt)
-0.038
(0.024)
Trade as a percentage of GDP (ln) -0.042(0.043)
Political stability and the degree to 
which the process becomes violent or 
tends to disintegrate
-0.058
(0.037)
Education Index 0(0.002)
Confidence level in the judiciary system 
(%)
0.001
(0.001)
Legal system/conflict resolution (ln) 0.011(0.025)
Freedom of the press (sqrt) 0.031**(0.014)
Good Governance Index 2.394***
(0.29)
General Government Consumption as a 
% of GDP (sqrt)
0.090***
(0.024)
Senior management time spent in 
dealing with requirements of 
government regulation (%) (ln)
0.048**
(0.024)
Internet users (ln) 0.043*(0.024)
Middle east 0.01(0.062)
Africa 0.123**(0.059)
Latin America 0.064
(0.056)
East Asia 0.195***
(0.057)
South Asia -0.012(0.092)
Constant -0.489(0.541)
Observations 172
R-squared 0.88
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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4. CASE STUDIES
There  are  three  types  of  initiatives  aimed  at  capitalizing  on 
Internet technologies and these include e-government, awareness, 
and exposure of corrupt activities.
4.1  E-government  transparency  efforts 
(Paraguay)
E-government activities are designed to make governments more 
transparent.  Government  agencies  can  help  reduce instances  of 
corruption  in  many  ways.  They  can  provide  information 
regarding  government  services,  provide  access  to  records 
regarding the many functions of government, and, at the highest 
level  of  sophistication,  allow  citizens  to  conduct  operations 
through automated web sites.
The efforts  of  governments  to develop  websites  is  a  trend that 
started in the last few years. While not originally the objective of 
these sites, it is clear that greater transparency in the government 
should help reduce corruption.
An  example  of  this  type  of  effort  is  a  Paraguayan  project 
managed  by  an  organization  called  Alter  Vida  [42].  With  the 
support  of  the  United  States  Agency  for  International 
Development  (USAID)  and  a  series  of  local  alliances,  the 
program  wants  to  promote  transparent  administration  of  funds 
and  efficient  provision  of  government  services.  It  seeks  to 
decentralize  authority  to  support  local  governments,  as  they 
believe that funds are lost in the transfer process from the federal 
to the local administrations. It is expected that the population will 
be an active participant. This is done through municipal councils, 
citizens committees,  and  public  hearings,  but also by providing 
access  to  government  information  such  as  publication  of 
municipal  personnel  and  salaries,  publication  of  timely  and 
complete  budget  information,  asset disclosure  of  public 
employees  above  a  certain  pay  level,  procedures  for  hiring 
employees, publication of government expenditures on publicity, 
and performance indicators. Many of these are provided through 
the  Internet.  It  is  clear  from  the  project  description  that  the 
Internet  plays  only  a  small  role  in  the  overall  plan  to  fight 
corruption and  the program relies much  more on technical  and 
financial  assistance to governments.  Other similar e-government 
initiatives  show  that  the  amount  of  information  on  the site  is 
overwhelming and the users do not have the ability to evaluate or 
analyze this information. In many instances it is not clear whether 
all of the information is made available. The availability of such a 
vast amount of content makes it difficult to detect incidences of 
corruption.  Better organized and analyzed government data may 
be necessary to increase transparency.
4.2  Corruption  Awareness  Efforts  (Latin 
America)
Other types of projects that take advantage of the Internet’s ability 
to  diffuse  information  widely  are  awareness  sites.  These  web 
pages allow the collection of corruption related material that can 
help  government,  private  companies,  and  other  types  of 
organizations  such  as  nonprofits  or  schools  to  learn  about 
corruption. These sites are repositories and destination points for 
individuals concerned about corruption or belong to organizations 
that focus on the abatement of the problem.
An  example  of  this  type  of  site  is  Respondanet 
(http://www.respondanet.com/),  a  project  also  sponsored  by 
USAID  as  part  of  the agency’s  Americas'  Accountability/Anti-
Corruption Project (AAA).  Respondanet first started as a project 
that involved direct support to countries in Latin America. It was 
designed to improve, among other things, financial management 
and  auditing.  Support  consisted  of  technical  assistance  and 
training.  The  project  has  been  in  existence  since  1989.  After 
launching  the Respondanet  website in 1998,  USAID  selected a 
consulting  company,  Casals,  to  continue  its  management. 
Respondanet  is  a  bilingual  site  with  pages  in  English  and 
Spanish. 
The site is not aimed at individual citizens but to organizations 
that work to fight corruption. It is valuable because, in addition to 
providing  information,  it  makes  individuals  aware  of  other 
organizations working on similar problems. 
The  site  contains  freely  available  access  to  online  documents, 
speeches, conference presentations, reports, surveys and links to 
other corruptions  related sites.  Since 2003 the site has  received 
4,937,917 hits. This corresponds to an average of 5,095 hits per 
day.  These are not  unique hits  but  if  we assume  that  a  visitor 
reaches 10 pages every time that he/she goes to the site then this 
means that there are approximately 500 people a day visiting the 
site.
When  USAID  was  sponsoring  the  website2 it  conducted  an 
evaluation  that  praised  the organization  for  the having  current, 
accurate, well organized, and freely available content among other 
positive  features.  While  the  site  was  positively  rated,  Casals 
recognizes that there are other things that could potentially make 
the site more effective.  If  they were able to obtain  information 
about visitors through their site they would have a clearer idea of 
who is visiting them and for what reasons. They could also have 
country web pages so that an individual from a country does not 
have to waste time trying to find information relevant to him. In 
addition Casals also recognizes that there is so much information 
on the site that a visitor could suffer from information overload. 
Similarly  Casals  believes  that  the Internet  is  just  one  of  many 
tools  that  can  fight  corruption.  They  do  not  believe that  a  site 
alone is sufficient to deter this type of activity. 
Another site that also aims  to raise awareness  of the corruption 
problem  is  Mexico’s  “Hágalo  usted  mismo”  (do  it  yourself, 
available  at  http://www.hagaloustedmismo.gob.mx).  The  site is 
sponsored  by  the Public  Functions  Secretariat.  It  is  interactive, 
allowing individuals,  companies,  government organizations,  and 
universities to obtain information that would reduce instances of 
corruption.  Figure 5 provides  two screen shots of the site. This 
consists primarily of codes of ethics and best practices. It also has 
an interactive quiz called “corrupto yo?” (Am I corrupt?). Unlike 
Respondanet,  the  do  it  yourself  site  has  tools  that  empower 
individuals by making them aware of their rights and obligations. 
They do so through comic strips that illustrate simple guidelines, 
as shown in the screen shot on the right.
Figure 5
Screen Shot of the Anti-corruption Site 
“Do it Yourself” in Mexico
2  USAID stopped funding for the site since 2004. Casals is thus 
now  fully  responsible  for  managing  and  keeping  the  site 
uptodate.
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4.3 Exposure Sites (El Salvador)
The purpose of these sites is to expose instances  of corruption. 
This  type  of  site  can  have  two  roles  that  can  help  reduce 
corruption.  The first is to deter people from engaging  in illegal 
activities  when  they  realize  that  their  crimes  can  be  widely 
known. The second role is to make the population aware of the 
crimes  that  government  representatives  are  committing.  This 
could potentially help them elect officials that do not have records 
of corruption. 
In Latin America there are few if any sites that focus exclusively 
on exposing  corruption.  For the most  part these are sections  of 
broader websites concerned about corruption.  One of the outlets 
that keeps a record of corruption crimes is the magazine Probidad 
(Probity,  available  at  http://probidad.org/index.php?
sm=2&id=espacio/index.html),  published  in  El  Salvador  by  an 
independent  organization  with  the  objective  of  educating  and 
empowering  citizens  to  fight  incidents  of  corruption.  The 
organization  relies  on  funding  from  governments,  foundations, 
other  non-profit  organizations  and  individual  members  of  the 
public.  The magazine publishes  information  to educate, expose, 
and report findings from short visits to other countries in the Latin 
American region. Their staff also wants to have a preemptive role 
that consists of identifying potential outlets of corruption and to 
try to correct them. There are two sections on the site that report 
corruption incidents. One is a database of reports that are posted 
biweekly about news related to corruption activities, conferences, 
publications,  and  anticorruption  efforts.  Another  section  of  the 
site  allows  individual  citizens  to  post  information  about 
corruption  incidents  or  other  issues  of  concern.  This  is  done 
through a blog. One of the main weaknesses of this type of site is 
the perceived bias  of  the people sponsoring  the site, which  can 
lead to reduced credibility and effectiveness of their efforts.
5. CONCLUSIONS 
Both  the statistical  results  and  the case  studies  reveal  that  the 
Internet  has  a  role  in  reducing  corruption  but  it  is  not  yet  an 
important factor. Our regression analysis attempts to focus on the 
effect  of  the Internet in  reducing  corruption after removing  the 
effect  of catchall  variables  such as  good governance and many 
other control variables.  We find that improving “freedom of the 
press,” which directly enhances transparency,  is more important 
than the Internet. On the other hand, many variables traditionally 
known for  reducing  corruption (education,  inequality  reduction, 
increasing trade with other countries) are found to be somewhat 
less important.
Corruption is a complex activity that results from other economic, 
social,  and political factors.  The good governance index (GGI), 
regarded  as  a  control  variable  to better focus  on  the others,  is 
statistically  most  significant.  Hence,  we  can  conclude  that 
improvements  in  governance  should  reduce  corruption.  The 
Internet is a tool that can help alleviate many factors that lead to 
bad  government.  The  publicly  available  information  on  the 
Internet  can  potentially  expose  criminal,  corrupt,  or  anti-social 
deeds by those in power. Of course this requires specific actions 
by  people  and  organizations.  The  actions  helping  good 
governance  and  improved  Internet  usage  as  a  tool  for  good 
governance  include  training,  technical  assistance,  direct 
awareness  efforts,  and  greater diffusion  of  information  via  the 
press or the Internet.
As Internet access improves, these websites are likely to become 
more useful. Governments, companies, and organizations are thus 
encouraged to use this tool in their anti-corruption efforts.  The 
two activities found to be more effective than the Internet, press 
freedom and red tape reduction, are themselves greatly helped by 
the Internet.
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